The Long-Run Behavior of Commodity Prices: Small Trends and Big Variability by Paul Cashin & C. John McCDermott
The Long-Run Behavior of Commodity Prices: 
Small Trends and Big Variability 
PAUL CASHIN and C. JOHN MCDERMOTT*
Using the longest dataset publicly available (The Economist’s index of industrial
commodity prices), we analyze the behavior of real commodity prices over the
period 1862–1999 and have two main findings. First, while there has been a down-
ward trend in real commodity prices of about 1 percent per year over the last 140
years, little support is found for a break in the long-run trend decline in commodity
prices. Second, there is evidence of a ratcheting up in the variability of price move-
ments. The amplitude of price movements increased in the early 1900s, while the
frequency of large price movements increased after the collapse of the Bretton
Woods regime of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s. Although there is a down-
ward trend in real commodity prices, this is of little practical policy relevance, since
it is small and completely dominated by the variability of prices. [JEL E32, Q11]     
“What commodity prices lack in trend, they make up for in variance.”
Angus Deaton (1999, p. 27)
T
his paper is concerned with the empirical behavior of commodity prices—in
particular, changes in the variability of commodity prices and in the trend
growth of prices over time. This is an important issue, since about 25 percent of
world merchandise trade consists of primary commodities, and many developing
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Wickham, and an anonymous referee for helpful discussion and comments.earnings (Cashin and Pattillo, 2000).1 Both sharp fluctuations and long-run trend
movements in commodity prices present serious challenges for many developing
countries, owing to their large impacts on real output, the balance of payments,
and government budgetary positions, and because of the consequent difficult prob-
lems they pose for the conduct of macroeconomic policy.
The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis states that owing to the low income elasticity
of demand for commodities and because total factor productivity increases have
been smaller for manufactured goods than for primary commodities, the price of
commodities relative to manufactured goods should decrease over time. If this
hypothesis were true, then the long-term outlook for commodity-exporting coun-
tries would be quite unfavorable. Few ideas in development economics have been
studied more intensively, yet remain so controversial. Prebisch (1950) and Singer
(1950) originally found a downward trend in real commodity prices.2 While later
work by Grilli and Yang (1988), using data from 1900–88, found that this down-
ward trend accelerated in 1921, several papers failed to detect such an adverse
trend movement (see Cuddington and Urzúa, 1989). Accordingly, much of the
empirical debate about the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis has centered on whether
the nonstationarity of real commodity prices takes the form of a deterministic
trend or a stochastic trend, or whether there are structural breaks in the trend.
Although many researchers have imposed a break around 1920 based on visual
inspection of the data, León and Soto (1997) have criticized such ad hoc proce-
dures for identifying breaks.3
The controversy over the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis probably remains unre-
solved because there is a low signal-to-noise ratio in the commodity price data.
Over the last 140 years, real commodity prices have declined by about 1 percent
per year, but this has not been a smooth process, with prices sometimes changing
by as much as 50 percent in a single year. Clearly, price variability is large rela-
tive to trend. This makes forecasting future commodity prices a difficult exercise,
since they are subject to large and unpredictable movements that may have persis-
tent effects. Because volatility is a key feature of commodity prices, information
on the nature of this volatility can be useful to policymakers. 
In addition to examining long-run price trends, this paper is concerned with
the length and size of commodity-price cycles. The topic is important, since
improving our understanding of the duration and amplitude of commodity-price
cycles will be a key input in efforts to stabilize the macroeconomic effects of
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1According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, primary commodities accounted for
42 percent of developing (low- and middle-income) countries’total merchandise exports in 1997, compared
with 19 percent for developed (high-income) countries. Commodity dependence is even greater in sub-
Saharan Africa, where primary commodities accounted for about 75 percent of total exports in 1997.
2Lipsey (1994) finds that once allowance is made for quality changes in manufactures (estimated to
be an improvement of at least 0.5 percent per year), the case is weak that there has been a long-term dete-
rioration in relative commodity prices.
3Cuddington and Urzúa (1989) and Perron (1990) found support for a structural break in 1920–21.
Powell (1991) prefers the hypothesis of three downward jumps in real commodity prices (in 1921, 1938,
and 1975), rather than a long-run trend decline. See Lutz (1999) for an overview of empirical tests of the
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis.movements in prices, particularly for commodity-dependent countries.
Information on the average duration and amplitude of commodity-price cycles can
be used in designing domestic countercyclical policies, in examining whether it is
useful to borrow externally in the presence of a temporary adverse shock, or in
deciding on the efficacy of national commodity-stabilization funds and interna-
tional market-sharing agreements (Deaton, 1999; Deaton and Miller, 1996). In
addition, the paper will examine whether the key features of commodity-price
cycles have changed over time. If so, what is driving the movements in price
volatility—is it a change in the frequency of price shocks or a change in the
amplitude of price shocks?
For policy purposes, understanding the cyclical behavior of commodity prices
is as important as understanding their underlying long-run trends. Although it is
generally agreed that the volatility of primary commodity prices is a significant
policy issue for commodity-exporting countries, there has been little previous
work examining this issue. A key exception is Cuddington and Liang (1999).
These authors study conditional variances and how these shift over time. Variances
lump together both the amplitude and duration of price movements, however, and
it might also be useful to distinguish between these effects in examining cycles in
commodity prices.
Cuddington (1992); Reinhart and Wickham (1994); and Cashin, Liang, and
McDermott (2000) find that shocks, which drive cycles in commodity prices, can
exhibit differing degrees of persistence across commodities. To our knowledge,
however, there has been little previous work that has studied the duration of
commodity-price cycles. Cuddington (1992) and Reinhart and Wickham (1994)
both study the duration and persistence of commodity-price cycles using the
Beveridge-Nelson decomposition technique, which gives a different meaning to
the cycle than the one we wish to adopt. The cycle derived from use of the
Beveridge-Nelson decomposition is defined in terms of deviation of the series
from trend (also known as the growth cycle). However, the definition of the cycle
we use here follows Watson (1994) and Cashin, McDermott, and Scott (forth-
coming) by dealing with the data in levels (also known as the classical cycle),
hence avoiding the somewhat subjective choice of which detrending method to
use. Price slumps (booms) are then described as periods of absolute decreases
(increases) in the level of the series, not as a period of below-trend (above-trend)
growth in the series.4
While it is easy to imagine what a booming or slumping market is, and despite
such terms being used frequently to describe the state of commodity markets, there
is no formal definition in the literature. One definition would describe a boom
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4For a discussion on the relative merits of measuring cycles as either classical cycles (with turning
points as peaks and troughs in the level of any given series) or growth cycles (with turning points as peaks
and troughs in the deviations from trend of any given series), see Pagan (1997) and Harding and Pagan
(2002). Canova (1998) also discusses the distortions introduced to the measurement of growth cycles by
the various commonly used trend-removal filters (such as first-differencing and the Hodrick-Prescott
filter). As our definition of the classical cycle relates to turning points in the level of the series, the decom-
position of the series into its “trend” and cycle components is not relevant.(slump) in commodity markets as a period of generally rising (falling) commodity
prices. Accordingly, we work with a definition of booms and slumps in commodity
prices that emphasizes movements in the level of commodity prices between local
peaks and troughs. This approach is in line with the business-cycle literature going
back to Burns and Mitchell (1946). The definition implies that commodity prices
have shifted from a boom phase to a slump phase if prices have declined from their
previous (local) peak (Cashin, McDermott, and Scott, forthcoming).
I. Tests for Change in Trend Growth,Volatility, and Cycle Duration
The issues raised previously can be resolved by comparing real commodity prices
over two different time periods within our sample. We will examine the differ-
ences from the early part of the sample in comparison with the later part of the
sample over two dimensions. First, we will analyze whether there have been
changes in trend growth rates of prices and, second, whether there have been
changes in the volatility of price movements. When analyzing the volatility of
price movements, we will examine changes in variances (which include changes
in both the amplitude and duration of price cycles) and changes in the duration of
cycles alone. Our focus on the duration perspective considers the relative
frequency of commodity-price cycles, while the volatility perspective also
considers changes in the amplitude of cycles. Specifically, we will test the null
hypotheses of no change in the trend growth of commodity prices, no change in
the duration of commodity-price cycles, and no change in the variance of
commodity prices.
Null Hypotheses to Be Tested
To form these tests, we need to split our time series into two subperiods. That is,
consider a sample period {X1,..., XN} split into two subperiods, {X1,..., XN1} and
{XN1+1,..., XN}. Thus the number of elements in the first subperiod is N1 and the
number of elements in the second subperiod is N2 = N – N1.
First, we examine whether there is any change in the trend rate of growth of
commodity prices. Following Watson (1994), the t-statistic for testing the null
hypothesis of no change in the trend rate of growth of prices is
(1)
where the average annual growth rate in the ith subperiod (i = 1, 2) is denoted by
X
—
i = (1/Ni)Σ i∆ ln Xt, and we define Σ 1 = Σ
Ni
t=1; Σ 2 = Σ
N
t=1+Ni. We also define the 
autocorrelation-robust variance error estimate as
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178where the variance estimators of the pre-whitened residuals (ε t = ut – ˆ ρ 1  ut–1 for
t = 2,…, N1 and ε t = ut – ˆ ρ 2  ut–1 for t = N1 + 2,…, N) are defined as s
2
i= (1/Ni –2 )Σ iε
2
t;
the autocorrelation coefficient is defined as ˆ ρ i = Σ i ut–1ut; and the raw residuals are
ut = Xt – X
—
1 for t = 1,…, N1 and ut = Xt  – X
—
2 for t = N1 + 1,…, N. When the break-
point is known, the t-statistic for testing the null hypothesis of no change in growth
rates follows a t-distribution.
The second feature of the data we want to examine is whether the variance of
price changes in two subperiods are different. To do so, we consider the ratio of
the sample variances. To test the null hypothesis of no change in the variance of
commodity-price changes, the test statistic we use is defined as
(3)
where the variance of price changes in each subperiod is denoted by s
2
i (for i = 1,2),
as defined for equation (2). When the breakpoint is known and the two samples are
independent, this test has an F-distribution with degrees of freedom (N – N1) and N1.
Finally, we examine whether the duration of booms and slumps in commodity
prices has changed. Identifying specific cycles in economic time series requires
precise definitions of a boom and a slump. For annual time series, a boom phase
is naturally defined as a period when the growth rate is positive; a slump phase is
obviously when the growth rate is negative. For future reference, we introduce the
following definitions:
Definition 1: For annual data, a boom is defined as a sequence of absolute
increases in the level of prices, and a slump is defined as a sequence of absolute
decrease in the level of prices.
Definition 2:A  cycle includes one boom and one slump.
To test the null hypothesis of no change in the duration of booms and slumps
in commodity prices, we adapt a nonparametric test suggested by Diebold and
Rudebusch (1992) that assumes the distributions of durations (of booms or
slumps) differ only in their means. Their test is a version of the Wilcoxon rank-
sum statistic, which is defined as5
(4)
where  ni denotes the number of boom phases in the ith subperiod (i  = 1,2);




2 denote the mean ranks of the duration of boom phases in
the first and second subperiods;6 and the standard error is defined as
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5The test is described in this section for a change in the duration of boom phases—the test for a
change in the duration of slump phases is the same.
6Following Diebold and Rudebusch (1992), in the case of a tie, the relevant ranks are replaced by the
average of the ranks of tied observations. (5)
When the breakpoint is known, the statistic for testing the null of no change in the
duration of booms can be used like a t-test that converges in distribution to a stan-
dard normal.7
Hypothesis Testing with Structural Change at an Unknown Break
The above-mentioned tests are conditional on structural change occurring at a
known point in time. However, many researchers select the breakpoint after exam-
ining plots of the data. This procedure implies that the breakpoint is a function of the
data, rather than being truly exogenous. Importantly, this endogenization of the
breakpoint-selection procedure (however informal) will alter the distributions of the
above test statistics. This means that searching for the breakpoint increases the prob-
ability of rejecting the null hypotheses of no change in trend growth, no change in
volatility, and no change in the duration of booms or slumps. For example, suppose
one tests for the date of a break in the duration of booms at the start of the First
World War (with our test having a nominal size of 5 percent), and one repeats the
test assuming the break is at the start of the Second World War (with that test also
having a nominal size of 5 percent). While both tests have a correct size of 5 percent,
the probability that at least one of these points has a break (assuming the two events
are independent) must be higher than 5 percent if we use the same critical values as
the individual tests (Cashin and McDermott, 2002). As a result, if we allow all points
in time to be potential breaks, then the probability of a break occurring at some point
in time is much greater than 5 percent (given standard critical values).
Clearly, for all three tests, we cannot assume that all breakpoints are known.
Accordingly, if one takes the view that the breakpoints are unknown, then our tests
for change in trend, duration, and volatility will need to account for the fact that
the breakpoints are dependent on the data. Our testing procedure is to search over
all possible breakpoints in the sample and select the largest of these tests, which
we denote as the sup Q test. That is, we are interested in test statistics of the form
(6)
where Q(π ) is the test statistic of interest, conditioned on the value of the break-
point π  = N1/N (for change in trend and volatility) and π  = n1/n (for change in cycle
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7See Lehmann (1975) for a general discussion of the Wilcoxon rank-sum statistic. In addition to the
standardized form of the statistic having an asymptotically standard normal distribution, it has an exact
sampling distribution, which can also be deduced. In large samples, it is not necessary to use the
Wilcoxon rank-sum statistic, since the standard t-test can be used to compare average durations. We prefer
to use the rank-sum statistic, however, to ensure the comparability of our results with earlier work.given π the test statistic Q(π ) has a distribution that can be represented by the prob-
ability density function f(x) and that has a cumulative density function F(x). Then
the cumulative distribution of sup Q(π ), if the Q statistics are independently
drawn, is 
(7)
where m is such that Pr (sup(x) < m) = 1 – α and α is the size of our test.8 Thus
the probability density function is given by the derivative
(8)
For example, if Q(π ) follows a normal distribution, as in the tests for a change in
the duration of booms and slumps, then sup Q(π ) will follow the distribution given
by the probability density function 
(9)
The distribution shown in equation (9), for the case when n = 7, is compared with
the standard normal distribution in Figure 1. It can clearly be seen that the effect
of searching over all possible breakpoints is to shift the distribution of the
Wilcoxon rank-sum statistic to the right. Without making this correction,
searching over breakpoints would increase the probability of falsely finding a
break in the duration of price booms or slumps. The correction counters this effect,
so that the probability of falsely accepting a break is maintained at the correct size
(in our case, 5 percent). Similarly, we can derive the probability density function
of the sup Q(π ) statistic if Q(π ) follows a t- or F-distribution, as in the test for a
change in trend growth rates or change in variance, respectively.
We also use these statistics to estimate the timing of any breakpoint. Intuitively,
the location of the maximum Q(π ) statistic (denoted as ˆ π ) will be a reasonable esti-
mator for the location of the breakpoint. That is, our estimator of the breakpoint is
(10) ˆ ππ =∈ ( ) {} ∈ inf :sup Π Π x Qx .
pdf m n x dx m
m n
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8If the Q-statistics are dependent, then the true size of our test will be too small, and we will have an
overly conservative test. In this case, any rejection of the null hypotheses (of no change in the trend rate
of growth of commodity prices, no change in the duration of commodity price cycles, or no change in the
variance of commodity prices) will be even stronger evidence of the existence of a change. To examine
the sensitivity of our assumption of the independence of the Q-statistics, we conducted a bootstrap exper-
iment (of 500 iterations) to compute the 5 percent critical values for the null hypotheses of no change in
the duration of booms and slumps. We find that the bootstrap (5 percent) critical values are about 2.6 for
changes in the duration of both booms and slumps; these are slightly lower than those derived from the
approximate critical values of equation (9), both of which are about 2.8.Defining ˆ π as a maximizer over Π instead of over [0, 1] serves the sole purpose of
excluding breakpoints located arbitrarily close to the ends of the sample.9
The principle behind the nonparametric tests that we have used is similar to the
parametric tests used in Andrews (1993), Hansen (2000), and Khan and Senhadji
(2001). That is, both the parametric and nonparametric methods search over all
possible breakpoints to determine the optimal location to use in splitting the
sample. In choosing between these approaches, however, there are the usual trade-
offs between parametric and nonparametric methods. That is, the nonparametric
method has the relative disadvantage of slower rates of convergence and less-
efficient estimation, but the relative advantage of less need to specify the functional
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Figure 1. Distribution of Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test
for a Change in Duration of Cycles
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The distribution of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (when there is a change in cycle durations of
known timing) is shown by the solid line and is N(0,1). The distribution of the sup W test (when there is
a change in cycle durations with unknown timing) is shown by the dashed line. The distribution for a
change in cycle durations with unknown timing is drawn for a possible seven breaks.
9Let Π    [0, 1] be the set of all possible breakpoints searched over. When searching for breakpoints
in the duration of booms and slumps, no trimming of the cycle data is undertaken, that is Π = [0, 1]. When
searching for breakpoints in growth rates or volatility, Π = [0.1, 0.9]. For our data series (1862–1999), this
means that the first 15 and the last 15 observations will be excluded from being possible breakpoints in
growth rates or volatility. Testing whether a sample has a breakpoint at its extremities is not desirable,
because statistics tend to diverge to infinity since they cannot discriminate between true breakpoints and
boundary conditions.form of the model. This advantage of nonparametric methods would seem to be
particularly important when testing for changes in the duration of cycles.
II. Data
In analyzing commodity-price movements, we use the longest dataset publicly
available—the industrial commodity-price index of The Economist. The real annual
data consist of the nominal industrial commodity-price index (dollar-based with
base 1845–50 = 100, weighted by the value of developed-country imports), deflated
by the GDP deflator of the United States, over the period 1862–1999. While data
are available on the nominal index back to 1851, data prior to 1857 are incomplete
and data between 1857–61 are available only for January of each year. For
1862–1910, the annual data are formed as an average of price observations in
January and July of each year; from 1911 onward, the annual data are an average
of observations for all months. The industrial commodity-price index consists of
the prices of textiles, metals, and nonfood industrial commodities. For details on the
composition and construction of the index, see the appendix.10
Figure 2 sets out both the nominal and real industrial commodity-price
indices, with the latter showing the potential command over U.S. resources of a
fixed quantity of industrial commodities. Over the period 1862–1999, nominal
prices of industrial commodities have increased about threefold. In the four
decades prior to the First World War, and in the two decades prior to 1972,
nominal prices of industrial commodities were remarkably stable. Movements in
the nominal price index reflect several historical events—the rise in cotton prices
in the wake of the shortfall in supplies caused by the U.S. Civil War of the 1860s,
the rapid rise in commodity prices during and shortly after the First World War and
their sharp decline in the Great Depression years of the 1930s, the steep rise in
prices accompanying the Second World and Korean Wars, the upturn in prices
during the commodity-price booms of the 1970s, and the sharp boom and slump
periods in nominal commodity prices during the 1980s and 1990s.
The index of real industrial prices, after being somewhat stable over its first
four decades, fell by four-fifths between 1900 and 1999, ending the century at a
record low (Figure 2). The purchasing power over American resources of a basket
of industrial commodities in 1999 is one-fifth the purchasing power yielded by
that same basket of commodities in 1862. While the purchasing power of indus-
trial commodities was slightly lower at the turn of the century than 40 years
earlier, and by the early 1950s was about 20 percent lower than in the early 1860s,
in the latter half of the twentieth century real industrial prices steadily declined.
The largest annual declines in commodity prices were 37 percent from 1930 to
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10The 2000 version of The Economist’s dollar-based industrial commodity-price index (base
1995 = 100, weighted by the value of world imports during 1994–96) comprises 16 commodities, with
weights of 45.9 percent for nonfood agricultural commodities and 54.1 percent for metals. The metals
index consists of aluminum, copper, nickel, zinc, tin, and lead; the nonfood agricultural index consists of
cotton, timber, hides, rubber, wool 64s (fine wool), wool 48s (coarse wool), palm oil, coconut oil,



































Table 1. Industrial Commodity Price Facts, 1862–1999
Autocorrelation Autocorrelation Coefficient Volatility
Coefficient Coefficient Persistence of Persistence
Period (one year)( two years)( in years) Variation Skewness Kurtosis (in years)
1862–1999 0.93 0.85 3.29 0.38 –0.20 1.96 2.79 
[2.18, 6.12] [1.86, 5.01]
1862–1913 0.57 0.19 1.26 0.08 0.96 4.59 0.85
[0.79, 2.24] [0.62, 1.19]
1946–71 0.81 0.67 0.90 0.30 0.83 2.52 0.62
[0.38, 2.59] [0.17, 1.57]
1972–99 0.67 0.32 0.75 0.28 0.64 2.70 0.72
[0.34, 1.70] [0.25, 1.99]
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The underlying data are an (annual) index number of The Economist’s real industrial commodity prices, calculated as The Economist’s nominal indus-
trial commodity-price index (dollar-based with base of 1845–50 = 100, weighted by the value of developed-country imports), deflated by the GDP deflator of the
United States over the period 1862–1999 (see Section II and the appendix for details). Autocorrelations of one and two years are the first- and second-order auto-
correlation coefficients, respectively. Persistence is measured by the half-life of innovations—that is, ln (1/2)/ln (α ) where α is the autoregressive parameter from
an AR(1) model for the levels (for the third column) and from an ARCH(1) model for the variances (for the seventh column). For α ≥ 0, the half-life is the length
of time (number of years) until the impulse response of a unit shock is half its original magnitude. The 90 percent confidence interval for the half-life is given in
square brackets, for both the third and seventh columns. The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the arithmetic mean. The skewness
measure is µ 3/(µ 2)1.5 and the kurtosis measure is µ 4/(µ 2)2, where µ r denotes the rth (central) moment. The skewness of a symmetrical distribution, such as the normal
distribution, is zero; similarly, the kurtosis of the normal distribution is 3.1931 and from 1974 to 1975, and 34 percent between 1951 and 1952. Conversely,
the largest annual rises in commodity prices were 49 percent from 1972 to 1973,
and 33 percent between 1916 and 1917.
Unlike most previous studies of long-run commodity prices, ours does not use
the Grilli-Yang (1988) index of real commodity prices. The Grilli-Yang index runs
from 1900 through 1988, while The Economist’s industrials index covers four
more decades of data and provides the best chance of understanding the long-run
trends in the data (and thus allows for a more powerful test of the Prebisch-Singer
hypothesis). In any event, the correlation of the Grilli-Yang index with The
Economist’s industrials index is very high. Over the period used by Grilli and Yang
the correlation between the two series is 0.81, and is even higher (0.85) when the
Grilli and Yang data are extended until 1999.11
Before proceeding further, it is useful to have in mind some of the salient
features of this price index. Table 1 summarizes some of the facts about The
Economist’s real industrial commodity-price series (in levels) for both its full history
and for three subperiods. Following Eichengreen (1994), Reinhart and Wickham
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Real price index (left scale)



















Figure 2. Nominal and Real Price Indexes for 
Industrial Commodities, 1862–1999
11One key difference between the Grilli-Yang index and The Economist’s industrials index is that the
former trends downward more slowly than the latter. This is largely because in addition to industrial commodi-
ties, the Grilli-Yang index includes food commodities (especially beverages), which have displayed a substan-
tially smaller trend decline than non-food commodities over the sample period (see Grilli and Yang, 1988).(1994), and Cuddington and Liang (1999), the subperiods have been selected to
analyze the behavior of commodity prices across exchange rate regimes, since fixed
and flexible exchange rate regimes have been found to yield differing volatility of
real commodity prices.12 The subperiods include the fixed exchange rate regime of
the gold standard (1862–1913) and the Bretton Woods system (1946–71), and the
flexible exchange rate regime that followed the Bretton Woods period (1972–99).
For the full sample, both the first- and second-order autocorrelation coefficients
are quite high, indicating that prices tend to revert to their means or to a determin-
istic trend at a rather slow rate. The persistence measure in the third column presents
the half-life of shocks to the industrial commodity-price index—that is, the length of
time it takes for half of any initial shock to dissipate (see Cashin, Liang, and
McDermott, 2000). The half-life of reversion is found to be about 3 years, with 90
percent of the shocks to industrial commodity prices having a half-life ranging
between 2.2 and just over 6 years. In addition, the persistence of shocks in the flex-
ible exchange rate regime appears to be less than for the fixed exchange rate regimes.
Consistent with earlier findings by Deaton and Laroque (1992), the coefficient
of variation reveals that there is substantial annual variability in the real price of
industrial commodities, particularly in the flexible exchange rate regime. There is
negative skewness in commodity prices for the full sample period, since there appear
to be slightly more downward spikes in prices than upward spikes (see also Figure
2). During each of the subperiods, there was substantial positive skewness, indi-
cating that the upper tail of the distribution of prices is thicker than its lower tail. For
the full sample and the latter two subperiods, commodity prices display kurtosis,
with tails thicker than the normal distribution (platykurtic), indicating that large
price movements are relatively common. The clear exception is the leptokurtic
behavior (tails thinner than the normal distribution) of prices during the gold-stan-
dard period, indicating that large price movements were relatively uncommon. The
final (seventh) column of Table 1 examines the persistence of price volatility, finding
that the volatility of prices tends to revert to its average relatively quickly. Over the
various subperiods, the persistence in volatility is relatively small, in that half the
innovation in the variances has dissipated in less than a year. Accordingly, there is
little evidence of clustering of large or small variances in commodity prices.
Figure 3 presents a histogram (frequency distribution) of the (absolute) change
in the real price of industrial commodities. The distribution is centered at a little
less than zero but has a high variance (standard deviation of 12.6 percent per year)
around its mean trend decline (–1.3 percent per year), a slightly larger median
decline (–2.0 percent per year), and fat tails (especially for price declines). Clearly,
the large dispersion in price changes dominates the relatively small secular decline
in real commodity prices.13
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12The validity of this finding will be examined in Section III below, when analyzing the presence or
absence of a significant break in the variability of industrial commodity prices.
13While this point estimate of the annual average rate of decline of relative commodity prices is larger
than those typically derived for the ratio of commodity prices to manufactured goods (estimated at about
0.7 percent per annum) using the Grilli-Yang (1988) data, it is close to those obtained using alternate rela-
tive commodity-price data (see Sapsford, 1985, and Lutz, 1999). III. Empirical Results
In this section, we present the results from our empirical analysis of the properties
of the index of the real price of industrial commodities. Specifically, we will test
the null hypotheses of no change in the trend growth of commodity prices, no
change in the variance of commodity prices, and no change in the duration of
commodity-price cycles.
Trends
The salient feature of the real price of industrial commodities is that it has a
downward trend over nearly 140 years, which seems to become marginally
steeper around 1920 (Figure 2). The trend decline in the series is 1.3 percent per
year. However, prices of industrial commodities showed no significant change in
trend, as the t-statistic for our test of trend break (tX –) over all possible break-
points was less than the 5 percent critical value (of the sup t distribution) of 3.30
in absolute value. Although not significant, the highest t-statistic for changing
trends (of 1.15) was located at 1917, which is close to the trend break imposed in
earlier work by Grilli and Yang (1988) and Cuddington and Urzúa (1989). The
average annual rate of decline in industrial commodity prices between 1917 and
1999 is 2.3 percent.
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Figure 3. Histogram of Percentage Change in Real Commodity PricesThe trend lines over the 60–70 year periods before and after the First World
War are a poor representation of the local (say decade-long) trends—the local
trends vary dramatically from 2.7 percent in the 1910s to –6.9 percent in the
1990s. However, yearly price movements are often very large, in excess of 40
percent in some cases (see Figure 3). Between 1862 and 1999, more than 5 out of
every 100 annual price movements exceeded 20 percent. Accordingly, trends
appear to be widely variable and largely uncertain, and cannot be relied upon as a
basis for making forecasts of future commodity prices.
Volatility
Sharp price movements can be seen in Figure 4, which shows the rate of
change of the real price of industrial commodities. Annual price changes of
less than 20 percent are the norm prior to the abandonment of the gold stan-
dard in 1913. After that, annual price changes of more than 20 percent occurred
on 13 occasions.
In examining changes in the volatility of the real price of industrial commodi-
ties, the largest F-statistic for testing the null hypothesis of no change in the vari-
ance of price changes is 6.99, which is larger than the 5 percent critical value (of
the sup F distribution) of 4.75. The largest F-statistic occurs in 1899. We have a
run of very high F-statistics from the end of the nineteenth century to the start of
the First World War. In fact, the F-statistic as a function of breakpoints has a local
peak in 1914 (with a value of 6.23).
Figure 4 also shows the 95 percent confidence bands around the growth rate
movements. For industrial commodities, the bands widen sharply after the change-
point in 1899. Importantly, the frequency with which price movements exceed two
standard deviations appears to increase after 1971. In the roughly 70-year period
from 1899 to 1971, movements in industrial commodity prices exceeded two stan-
dard deviations four times, while there were four price movements in excess of
two standard deviations in less than 30 years from 1972 to 1999.14
Cycles
Prior to applying the Wilcoxon rank-sum statistic to examine whether there has
been a change in the duration of booms and slumps in real commodity prices,
two features of the commodity-price data need to be verified. First, the duration
of booms and slumps needs to be independent (in order to derive appropriate crit-
ical values for the Wilcoxon test). Second, there should be no change in the trend
rate of growth of prices. These pretests are necessary because commodity-price
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14Part of the change in the volatility of the price of industrial commodities could be due to the manner
in which the industrial price index has been constructed (in particular, to changes in the commodity
composition of the index), as argued by Romer (1986) in the context of U.S. employment data for 1900
through 1980. However, Cuddington and Liang’s (1999) analysis of the Grilli-Yang data on relative
commodity prices—which are measured using a uniform composition between 1900 and 1992—also
shows an increase in volatility after the Bretton Woods period.cycles are delineated in this paper on a non-trend-adjusted basis. As a result, any
difference in trend growth rates in prices across subperiods would affect the
comparability of durations of booms and slumps (Diebold and Rudebusch,
1992). The independence of duration assumption appears to be confirmed, as the
correlations between the length of successive booms or the length of successive
slumps (over the entire sample) are only significantly different from zero at about
the 15 percent level of significance.15 As to the assumption of no difference in
trend growth, we have demonstrated previously that the growth of prices exhib-
ited no significant change in trend across all possible breakpoints. Accordingly,
changes in trend growth are not influencing our findings on changes in the dura-
tion of commodity-price cycles.
In this section, we examine the stability of real industrial commodity prices in
terms of the relative duration, rather than relative volatility, of the commodity-
price cycle. This duration perspective focuses on the lengths of boom and slump
phases of the commodity-price cycle, while the (preceding) volatility analysis
focuses on the amplitude of commodity-price movements.16
THE LONG-RUN BEHAVIOR OF COMMODITY PRICES
189
Log difference of real price of industrial commodities
Upper bound of 95 percent confidence band











1992 1982 1972 1962 1952 1942 1932 1922 1912 1902 1892 1882 1872 1862
Figure 4. Volatility of Real Price of Industrial Commodities, 1862–1999
15The correlation between the length of successive booms (–0.36) is just significant at the 15 percent
level, while the correlation between the length of successive slumps (0.24) is much less than the 15
percent critical value, where the 15 percent critical values are 0.35 for booms and 0.34 for slumps, calcu-
lated as 1.44/T
1/2, where T = 17 (T = 18) is the number of successive booms (slumps).



































Table 2. Duration and Rank of Booms and Slumps in Industrial Commodity Prices, 1862–1999
Duration
(in years) Rank sup W test
Cycle Peak Trough Boom Slump Boom Slump Boom Slump
1 1862 1868 7 17.5 1.5
2 1872 1879 4 7 9.5 17.5 0.0 2.3
3 1880 1886 1 6 2 14 1.3 2.5
4 1890 1895 4 5 9.5 10 1.1 2.2
5 1896 1898 1 2 2 4 2.1 1.3
6 1900 1902 2 2 9.5 4 1.9 0.6
7 1907 1909 5 2 16 4 0.9 0.1
8 1913 1915 4 2 9.5 4 0.9 0.4
9 1918 1921 3 3 9.5 10 0.9 0.4
10 1925 1931 4 6 9.5 14 0.1 0.1
11 1937 1939 6 2 17 4 0.1 0.6
12 1941 1943 2 2 9.5 4 0.8 1.2
13 1951 1954 8 3 18 10 0.0 1.2
14 1955 1962 1 7 2 17.5 0.0 0.5
15 1965 1971 3 6 9.5 14 0.0 0.2
16 1973 1975 2 2 9.5 4 0.0 0.9
17 1979 1986 4 7 9.5 17.5 0.0 0.0
18 1988 1993 2 5 9.5 10 0.0 0.0
19 1995 1999 2 4 9.5 10
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The number of possible breakpoints in the nature of cycles in real industrial commodity prices is 18 for booms and 19 for slumps. A boom (slump) is
defined as a sequence of absolute increases (decreases) in the level of prices. Values for the sup W statistic exceeding the 5 percent critical value (2.75 for booms
and 2.77 for slumps) indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of no change in the duration of booms and slumps in real commodity prices. In the case of a tie, the
relevant ranks are replaced by the average of the ranks of tied observations.Using our definition of booms and slumps, we find there are 18 completed
cycles in industrial commodity prices, where a cycle includes one boom and one
slump, over the full sample period. The dates of the peaks and troughs in indus-
trial commodity prices are shown in Table 2, along with their duration, the rank
number of that duration, and the sup W statistic testing the null hypothesis of no
change in duration of booms and slumps in commodity prices.
Over these 18 cycles, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no change in the
duration of either booms or slumps, irrespective of the location of the breakpoint.
That is, for all 18 possible breakpoints in the duration of each boom and slump,
the largest t-statistics for duration change in booms (2.1) and slumps (2.5) were
less than the 5 percent critical values (of the sup W distribution) of 2.75 and 2.77,
respectively. The shaded portions of Figure 5 denote the boom phase, while the
unshaded portions denote the slump phase, of each cycle. Consistent with earlier
work on commodity-price cycles (Cashin, McDermott, and Scott, forthcoming),
on average price slumps (4.2 years) last longer than price booms (3.6 years).
Large Cycles
Clearly, there has been an increase in the last 30 years in the frequency with which
large price movements have occurred. To investigate further this feature of the
price series, we examine whether there has been any change in the duration of
large booms and large slumps, which are formally defined as follows:
Definition 3: For annual data, a large boom is defined as a sequence of gener-
ally increasing prices that have had a price movement of at least 25 percent over
the phase, and a large slump is defined as a sequence of generally decreasing
prices that have had a price movement of at least 25 percent over the phase.
Definition 4:A  large cycle includes one large boom and one large slump.
Using our definition of large booms and large slumps, we find seven
completed large cycles in the real price of industrial commodities (Figure 6).17The
peaks and troughs of these large cycles in industrial commodity prices are reported
in Table 3, together with the durations of the large booms and slumps, their ranks,
and the sup W statistic that tests the null hypothesis of no change in duration of
large booms and large slumps. Cumulative price declines of 25 percent or more
have occurred eight times over the period 1862–1999—the longest-lasting being
the 106 percent decline in the two decades covering 1951–71 and the sharpest
being the 39 percent decline between 1973 and 1975.
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17The assumed independence of durations appears to be confirmed for large booms and slumps, as
the correlation between the length of successive large booms or the length of successive large slumps
(over the entire sample) are not significantly different from zero at even the 20 percent level of signif-
icance. The correlation between the length of successive large booms (–0.27) and length of successive
large slumps (0.02) is much less than the 20 percent critical values (0.52 for large booms and 0.48 for
large slumps), calculated as 1.28/T 1/2, where T = 6 (T = 7) is the number of successive large booms
(large slumps).We find significant breaks in the duration of large booms and large slumps in
the price of industrial commodities (Table 3). The date of the changepoint in large
booms of the price of industrial commodities lies somewhere between the booms
of 1931–51 and 1971–73; that is, during the period before the dissolution of the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates.18 The date of the changepoint in
large slumps of the industrial commodity price index lies between the slumps of
1951–71 and 1973–75; that is, in 1972. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test suggests that
the duration of cycles in industrial commodity prices shortened significantly after
the Bretton Woods period. Clearly, the duration of large booms and large slumps
has been shortened in the post-Bretton Woods period because of the increased
frequency of large movements in the price index.
The post-Bretton Woods shifts in the duration of large cycles in commodity
prices are economically, as well as statistically, significant. Our results indicate
that although real industrial commodity prices spent about 62 percent of the post-
Bretton Woods period in a large slump, only about 43 percent of the period prior
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Figure 5. Cycles in Real Price of Industrial Commodities, 1862–1999
Notes: Shaded portions denote the boom phase, and unshaded portions the slump phase, of each
commodity-price cycle. A boom (slump) is defined as a sequence of absolute increases (decreases) in the
real price of industrial commodities.
18Major world currencies began to float against one another in the last quarter of 1971, following the
United States’s abrogation of the Bretton Woods gold clause in August 1971, which suspended convert-
ibility of official dollar reserves into gold.to the early 1970s was spent in a large slump. In addition, the mean duration of the
post-Bretton Woods large boom is one-tenth the mean duration of its pre-1970s
counterpart, while the mean duration of the post-Bretton Woods large slump is
one-half the mean duration of its pre-1970s counterpart.
Three conclusions emerge from our analysis of the long-run data. First,
trends in real commodity prices are highly volatile, which implies that for
various subperiods we cannot tell whether differences in trend rates of growth
are statistically significant. Moreover, because trend rates of growth in
commodity prices are unstable, knowing the historical trend growth rate (over
the full period or any subperiod) is of no practical policy relevance. Second, real
commodity-price movements have become more variable over time—volatility
first increased around 1899 and then again in the early 1970s. The first increase
was due to price movements with bigger amplitudes. The second increase was
due to a rise in the frequency of large price movements, which consequently
reduced the duration of large price cycles. Third, long-run trends in real
commodity prices are small in comparison with annual variability in prices,
making short-run movements in commodity prices highly unpredictable. In
terms of its economic (and statistical) significance, price variability completely
dominates long-run trends.
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Figure 6. Large Cycles in Real Price of Industrial Commodities, 1862–1999
Notes: Shaded portions denote the boom phase, and unshaded portions the slump phase, of each large
commodity-price cycle. A large boom (large slump) is defined as a period during which the level of real



































Table 3. Duration and Rank of Large Booms and Large Slumps in Industrial Commodity Prices, 1862–1999
Duration
(in years) Rank sup W test
Cycle Peak Trough Boom Slump Boom Slump Boom Slump
1 1862 1868 7 4.5 0.0
2 1907 1915 39 8 7 6 1.8 0.5
3 1918 1931 3 13 4 7 1.3 1.2
4 1951 1971 20 20 6 8 2.5 3.6
5 1973 1975 2 2 2 1 1.2 1.2
6 1979 1986 4 7 5 4.5 1.9 1.4
7 1988 1993 2 5 2 3 1.0 1.1
8 1995 1999 2 4 2 2
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The number of possible breakpoints in the nature of large cycles in real industrial commodity prices is 7 for large booms and 8 for large slumps. A large
boom (large slump) is defined as a period during which the level of industrial commodity prices increases (decreases) by at least 25 percent. Values for the sup W
statistic exceeding the 5 percent critical value (2.39 for large booms and 2.44 for large slumps) indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of no change in the dura-
tion of large booms and large slumps in real commodity prices. In the case of a tie, the relevant ranks are replaced by the average of the ranks of tied observations.What Explains the Post-Bretton Woods Increase in the Variability of
Commodity Prices?
Our results indicate that since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods exchange
regime, real commodity prices have exhibited increasing variability. This finding
confirms previous work, which postulated an important link between the growing
volatility of nominal and real exchange rates since the early 1970s and the
increased instability of the nominal and real (dollar-denominated) commodity
prices (Chu and Morrison, 1984; Reinhart and Wickham, 1994; Cuddington and
Liang, 1999). Indeed, an examination of the correlation between the volatility of
the nominal U.S. dollar-U.K. pound exchange rate (as measured by the standard
deviation of the growth rate) and the volatility of our measure of real commodity
prices, across four major exchange rate regimes covering 1862–1999 (including
the gold-standard, interwar, Bretton Woods, and post-Bretton Woods periods),
reveals that it is very strong (0.99).19
What might explain this increasing volatility of real commodity prices during
the post-Bretton Woods flexible exchange rate regime? Some of the increase in the
variability of nominal commodity prices is simply due to the mechanical effect of
the denomination of commodity prices in a single currency (the dollar) at a time
of fluctuating exchange rates. It is also likely, however, that movements in the
dollar exchange rate vis-à-vis other currencies affect the variability of dollar
commodity prices, since such movements influence both the supply of, and the
demand for, commodities.
A possible relationship among more flexible exchange rate regimes, external
debt, and the increased volatility of dollar commodity prices has been suggested
by Gilbert (1989). Mussa (1986) found that owing to slowly adjusting national
price levels, real exchange rates are more volatile in periods of nominal exchange
rate flexibility than in periods of nominal fixity. This increase in real exchange rate
variability has real consequences, in that it affects the supply curves of
commodity-exporting countries and, hence, affects the level and variability of
world prices for commodities. Gilbert (1989) argues that the interaction between
flexibility of the U.S. dollar and dollar-denominated debt has affected the level
and variability of commodity prices. For example, he finds that the appreciation of
the dollar in the first half of the 1980s led to greater-than-proportionate real
depreciations of developing-country currencies, boosted the supply of commodi-
ties (owing to the need to maintain export revenues to service growing debt
obligations in the presence of credit rationing), and accordingly induced greater-
than-proportionate reductions in dollar commodity prices. Although demand
conditions in importing countries are also a key determinant of commodity prices,
recent explanations of the rising variability in nominal commodity prices have
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19Using data for a group of 20 countries over 100 years, recent work by Taylor (2000) confirms the
dramatically increased variability in both nominal and real exchange rates in the post-Bretton Woods
period, in comparison with the gold-standard and Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate periods. Taylor also
finds a very high correlation between real exchange rate volatility and nominal exchange rate volatility
across all four exchange rate regimes.focused on increased instability of the supply of commodities, induced in part by
increasingly volatile real exchange rates and the dismantling of domestic and
international price stabilization schemes (see Reinhart and Wickham, 1994).20 In
the presence of sluggishness in the adjustment of national price levels (owing in
particular to slow adjustment of the price of nontradables), nominal exchange rate
flexibility heightens the variance of real commodity prices.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has examined whether there have been changes in the long-run
behavior of world commodity prices. Specifically, we looked at trends in real
commodity prices, the duration of price booms and slumps, and the volatility of
price movements. Although there has been a downward trend in real commodity
prices of about 1 percent per year over the last 140 years, little support is found
for a break in the long-run trend decline in commodity prices. In contrast, there
was evidence of a ratcheting up in price volatility over this period. There have
been two periods of increased volatility—at the beginning of the twentieth century
and after 1971. While earlier studies have noted the increased volatility of
commodity prices in the twentieth century, what was not explained was the nature
of this change in volatility. Our results indicate that although the rise in volatility
in the early 1900s was due to greater amplitude of price movements, the further
rise in volatility in the early 1970s was due to the increased frequency of large
price movements (that is, to a fall in the duration of large price cycles).
Importantly, within-sample trends in commodity prices are completely
overwhelmed by the observed variance of price movements. Accordingly, in
attempting to draw policy conclusions from the analysis of the behavior of
commodity prices, concerns about long-run declines in price trends (in partic-
ular, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis) are much less important than concerns
over the implications of increasing price volatility. In predicting movements in
commodity prices, it is important not to be confused by the presence of large,
long-lived booms and slumps—such cycles are highly unlikely to indicate any
major change in long-run prices. Although there is a downward trend in real
commodity prices, this is of little practical policy relevance, because it is small
when compared with the variability of prices. In contrast, rapid, unexpected,
and often large movements in commodity prices are an important feature 
of their behavior. Such movements can have serious consequences for the terms 
of trade, real incomes, and fiscal positions of commodity-dependent countries,
and have profound implications for the achievement of macroeconomic
stabilization.
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20While the foreign supply of commodities is increased by a real appreciation of the dollar, foreign
demand for commodities should fall, although it appears that most of the variability in commodity prices
is driven by the supply side (Reinhart and Wickham, 1994; and Deaton and Miller, 1996). Dornbusch
(1985) argued that a real appreciation of the dollar would increase the real price of any given commodity
in terms of the foreign currency, reduce demand by the rest of the world, and (for a given supply) induce
a fall in the commodity’s real market-clearing price (expressed in U.S. dollars). APPENDIX
The Economist’s Industrial Commodity-Price Index
The Economist’s U.S. dollar-based industrial commodity-price index covers 1862–1999, and
has been calculated by the compiler as a linked version of price indices first published in 1864
(see The Economist, “A Raw Deal for Commodities,” April 17, 1999). 
The commodity coverage of this index has been revised several times over this long period.
Up to 1911, the index comprised the unweighted average (arithmetic mean) of 16 industrial
commodities traded on British and U.S. wholesale markets, with prices converted (where neces-
sary) into dollars at the current rate of exchange. It consisted of the following nonfood commodi-
ties: fibers (two types of raw cotton, yarn, cloth, raw silk, flax and hemp, wool, and indigo);
metals (pig iron, copper, lead, and tin); and other raw materials (oils, leather, tallow (candle
wax), and timber). The 1911 revision broadened the composition of the index to include 28
industrial commodities; the additions were steam coal, house coal, iron and steel bars, jute,
petroleum, oilseeds, rubber, U.S. timber, Australian wool, flax, hemp, and soda crystals. A
historical comparison of the two commodity-price indices indicated that the revised composition
altered the level of the nominal index only slightly (see The Economist, “Our New Index
Number,” November 18, 1911). 
From the 1960s onward, commodities included in the index were weighted by their rela-
tive shares of developed-country (that is, members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development’s) imports of industrial commodities and reweighted annually
according to the most recent annual pattern of trade. Prior to the First World War and after the
Second World War, the index was typically calculated on an arithmetic-mean basis; between the
wars, it was calculated on a geometric-mean basis. 
The last major revision to the composition of the industrial commodity-price index
occurred in 1984, when copra and groundnuts were dropped and aluminum, nickel, and timber
were added to the index. The 1984 version of The Economist’s industrial commodity-price
index comprised 6 metals (aluminum, copper, nickel, zinc, tin, and lead) and 12 nonfood agri-
cultural goods (wool 64s (fine wool), wool 48s (coarse wool), cotton, jute, sisal, timber, hides,
rubber, palm oil, coconut oil, soybeans, and soybean oil).
For additional details, see The Economist (“Our New Index Number,” November 18, 1911;
“Our Index Number of Wholesale Prices,” December 15, 1928; “A Commodity Price Indicator,”
July 19, 1952; “Commodity Prices,” March 2, 1974; “Commodities Brief: The Economist
Indicators,” February 18, 1984; “A Raw Deal for Commodities,” April 17, 1999; and “A
Changed Commodity,” January 15, 2000).
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